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ABSTRACT
     This paper examines the predictive power of shifts in
monetary policy, as measured by changes in the real federal funds
rate, for output, inflation, and survey expectations of these
variables.  We find that policy shifts have larger effects on
actual output than on expected output, suggesting that agents
underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand.  Our
results help to explain the real effects of monetary policy, and
they provide negative evidence on the rationality of
expectations. EXPECTATIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY
I.  INTRODUCTION
     There is a growing consensus, based on both historical
analysis and econometric evidence, that monetary policy has
strong effects on real output.  There is not, however, any
consensus about how to explain this fact.  This paper explores
the idea that the non-neutrality of policy arises from a failure
of rational expectations.  Specifically, we present evidence that
agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy on
aggregate demand.
     Our central results concern the predictive power of policy
shifts for real output and for expectations of output.  We
measure policy shifts with changes in the real federal funds
rate; expectations are taken from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters.  Like previous researchers, we find that increases
in the funds rate reduce output at a horizon of roughly a year. 
A higher funds rate also causes survey respondents to  expect
lower output, but the effect on expected output is substantially
smaller than the effect on actual output.  Thus increases in the
funds rate lead systematically to negative errors in output
expectations, a violation of rational expectations.
     We also examine the predictive power of policy shifts for
inflation and for expectations of inflation.  Here, we cannot
reject rationality.  A rise in the real funds rate leads to a
fall in inflation at a horizon of two years, and a roughly equal2
fall in expected inflation.  Thus policy shifts do  not predict
errors in inflation expectations.
     Our results add new evidence to the general debate about the
rationality of expectations.  Most important, we find that
rationality fails in a particular direction, one which helps
explain the effects of monetary policy.  To make this point, we
analyze a simple macroeconomic model with sticky prices.  In the
model, policy is neutral under rational expectations.  We show,
however, that policy is non-neutral if agents systematically
underestimate the effects of policy on aggregate demand. 
Crucially, this assumption about expectations also produces
results that match our empirical findings: policy shifts predict
surprises in real output but not surprises in inflation.  Thus
our empirical results support our explanation for non-neutrality.
     The remainder of this paper contains four sections.  Section
II describes our empirical methodology and Section III presents
the results.  Section IV interprets the results using our model,
and Section V concludes.   
II. METHODOLOGY
     We explore the predictive power of shifts in monetary policy 
for three output variables: actual output, survey expectations of
output, and the difference between the two.  We perform a similar
procedure for inflation.  Here we describe the details of our
approach.     1Our choices of statistical models are based on previous
work and our own diagnostic tests.  Our choice of an inflation
process is based on Barsky (1987) and Ball and Cecchetti (1990). 
Our choice of an AR(1) process for output growth is based on
Beveridge and Nelson (1981) and  Campbell and Mankiw (1987);
Perron (1989) proposes a shift in the mean in 1973:2.  For both
3
A. The Basic Regressions
     We measure output by real GNP (or GDP starting in 1992), and
inflation by the GNP deflator.  For both variables, expectations
are given by the mean forecast from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF).  In an earlier version of this paper (Ball and
Croushore, 1995), we also examine expectations from the
Livingston survey of business economists and the Michigan survey
of consumers.  One might expect the behavior of expectations to
vary across the surveys, because of the different levels of
sophistication of forecasters, general economists, and consumers. 
It turns out, however, that our results are similar for all three
surveys.
     In studying both actual and expected variables, we examine
deviations from the forecasts of univariate statistical models. 
That is, we ask whether policy causes inflation and output to
deviate from the paths that one would forecast based on their
usual dynamics, and whether survey respondents expect these
deviations.  Our univariate model for quarterly output growth is
an AR(1) process with a mean that shifts in 1973:2.  Our model
for inflation is an IMA(1,1) process.  Given these models, we
compute statistical forecasts using rolling regressions.
1output and inflation, our ARIMA models are the smallest ones that
pass tests for autocorrelation (the Durbin-Watson and Q tests)
and the tests on forecast residuals suggested by Diebold and
Lopez (1996).
     2Expected output growth is calculated by comparing the mean
forecast for the level of output four quarters ahead to the mean
forecast for the current quarter.  Similarly, expected inflation
is constructed from forecasts of the GNP deflator four quarters
ahead and in the current quarter.  Actual output growth and
inflation are calculated from the data available three months
after the end of each quarter; this avoids problems arising from
rebenchmarking of data and changing base years.  For further
details about the Survey of Professional Forecasters, see
Croushore (1993).
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Letting y denote output, y
e denote survey expectations of
output, and y
f denote statistical forecasts, we ask whether
policy shifts predict y - y
f and whether they predict y
e - y
f. 
We also examine the difference between these two variables to see
whether policy shifts lead systematically to expectational
errors.  Note that this difference is simply y - y
e, and thus is
not affected by our choice of statistical models.  For inflation,
we define B, B
e, and B
f similarly and examine the analogous
combinations of variables.
2
     We measure policy shifts with changes in the real federal
funds rate.  This choice reflects the growing consensus among
researchers that the real funds rate captures the stance of
policy (e.g., Taylor, 1994).  For the results we report, the real
funds rate is the nominal rate minus the mean of expected
inflation from the SPF.  We obtain similar results when we
compute the real rate using other measures of expected inflation,
such as lags of actual inflation.     3The nominal federal funds rate is the quarterly average of
the daily rate.  Note that the data on current inflation
expectations are published near the mid-point of each quarter. 
Therefore B
e at t-1, and hence the real funds rate at t-1, are
known when agents form expectations at t. 
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B. Timing
Our data are quarterly.  We examine overlapping observations
of expected and actual variables over periods of one year.  For
an observation dated at quarter t, actual inflation is inflation
from t to t+4.  Our output variable is output growth from t to
t+4.  Expected inflation and growth from t to t+4 are reported by
survey respondents during quarter t.  Finally, our statistical
forecasts of inflation and output growth are based on quarterly
models estimated through t - 1 (the last quarter for which data
are available during quarter t).
We measure changes in the broad stance of policy with
changes in the real federal funds rate over periods of a year. 
For observation t, FF1 is the difference between the real funds
rate in quarter t-1 (the last quarter completed before
expectations are formed) and the rate four quarters earlier,
during t-5.  FF2 is the difference between the real funds rates
at t-5 and at t-9, and FF3 is the difference between t-9 and t-
13.  These annual changes in the funds rate are the regressors in
our equations for actual and expected inflation and output.
3 
     Our data begin in 1968:4, the first quarter of the SPF,
and end in 1995:2.6
III.  RESULTS
A. Output
Table 1 reports the results of regressing our output
variables, y - y
f, y
e - y
f, and y - y
e, on the federal-funds
variables.  We report results with FF1 as the only regressor and
with both FF1 and FF2; longer lags are never significant.  We
compute standard errors using the Newey-West procedure with eight
lags.  (OLS standard errors are inconsistent because our use of
overlapping observations induces serial correlation.)  For each
regression, we present the significance level of the  P
2 statistic
for the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the  FF variables
are zero.
Not surprisingly, FF1 has a negative and highly significant
effect on y - y
f.  That is, output growth falls below the level
predicted by a univariate forecast if the real federal funds rate
rose in the previous year.  When FF2 is included, it has a
smaller negative effect, with borderline significance (t=1.8). 
The sum of the coefficients on FF1 and FF2 is approximately 
-1.1.  That is, a one-percentage-point rise in the real funds
rate reduces output growth by 1.1 percentage points over two
years.
The FF variables also have negative effects on y
e - y
f: 
rises in the real funds rate lead survey respondents to expect
lower output.  However, the effects on expected output are
smaller than the effects on actual output:  the sum of the
coefficients on FF1 and FF2 is about -0.5.  The effects of the FF     4Note that, in Table 1, each coefficient in the equation for
y - ye is exactly the difference of the corresponding
coefficients in the equations for y - yf and ye - yf.  This fact
follows algebraically from the properties of OLS.
     5See Romer and Romer (1989, 1994) for discussions of Federal
Reserve policy during the 1970s and 1980s.
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variables on y - y
e, the expectational error, are the differences
between their effects on actual and expected output.  Thus a one-
point rise in the funds rate reduces y - y
e by a total of 1.1 -
0.5 = 0.6 percent.  These effects of the funds rate are highly
significant (p-value < .01).
4
Figure 1 plots time series for y - y
e and FF1.  FF1 is
plotted on an inverted scale to capture the negative relationship
between the variables.  The relationship between FF1 and y - y
e
is consistent over the sample, and does not depend on a few
outliers.  The relationship is clearest, however, in episodes of
large policy shifts.  The largest increases in FF1 occur in
1973:4 and 1981:4, which correspond to major tightenings by the
Federal Reserve to fight inflation.  (Recall that FF1 for quarter
t is the change in the real funds rate from t-5 to t-1.)  The
largest decreases in FF1 occur in 1971:2, 1975:3, and 1983:3,
which correspond to loosenings aimed at ending recessions.  In
all these episodes, y - y
e moves sharply around the same time as
FF1.
5
The significant effect of the FF variables on y - y
e is a
violation of rational expectations, because survey respondents
observe these variables when they form expectations.  Rationality8
is rejected because respondents systematically underestimate the
effects of policy shifts, both tightenings and easings.
B. Inflation
Table 2 presents regressions of B - B
f, B
e - B
f, and B - B
e
on various combinations of FF1, FF2, and FF3.  In the B - B
f
equations, FF1 has an insignificant coefficient and FF2 and FF3
have significantly negative coefficients.  That is, a policy
tightening reduces actual inflation with a two- to three-year
lag, compared to a one-year lag for its effects on output.  These
results confirm previous findings about lags in the effects of
policy (e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992).
     The effects of policy on expected inflation are similar to
the effects on actual inflation: in the equation for  B
e - B
f, FF1
has an insignificant coefficient and FF2 and FF3 have
significantly negative coefficients.  Most important, in contrast
to the results for output, the effects on actual and expected
inflation are close quantitatively.  The sum of coefficients when
all three FF variables are included is -0.54 in the B - B
f
equation and -0.49 in the B
e - B
f equation.  Because of these
similar results, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the  FF
variables have no effect on the expectational error  B - B
e.  The
P
2 statistics for this hypothesis have p-values ranging from 0.13
to 0.28, depending on the number of FF variables included.  Thus     6The SPF provides expectations of nominal income as well as
output and inflation.  When we regress errors in nominal-income
expectations on the FF variables, the coefficients are negative;
when FF1, FF2, and FF3 are included, the sum of coefficients is 
-0.48.  The negative nominal-income surprise after a tightening
is consistent with the negative surprise in real output and near-
zero surprise in inflation.  However, the standard errors in our
nominal-income equations are large, and so the effects of the  FF
variables on nominal-income surprises are not statistically
significant. 
9





     The behavior of expectations is crucial to the effects of
monetary policy on real output.  Recent research suggests that
these effects are difficult to explain under the assumption of
rational expectations, even using models with frictions in wage-
and price-setting.  In particular, models of staggered price
adjustment such as Taylor (1979) do not capture the inertia that
makes it costly to reduce inflation.  With rational expectations,
tight monetary policy can reduce inflation in these models
without any loss of output (Ball, 1991; Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). 
This result conflicts with the empirical evidence that
disinflations almost always cause recessions (e.g., Ball, 1994).
     It is easier to explain the effects of monetary policy if
expectations are less than fully rational (e.g., Roberts, 1997). 
Motivated by this idea, a large literature has tested the     7Other recent studies using the SPF include Keane and Runkle
(1990, 1995), who do not reject rationality, and Bonham and Cohen
(1995), who do reject rationality.
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rationality of expectations in surveys such as the SPF.  The
results are mixed, and authors who survey the literature differ
in their interpretations of the evidence (e.g., Lovell, 1986;
Croushore, 1998; Roberts).  Our results concerning output
expectations are a new piece of negative evidence on the validity
of rational expectations.
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     Most important, we determine a particular direction in which
rationality fails:  output expectations underreact to shifts in
monetary policy.  This particular failure of rationality helps
explain why policy is non-neutral.  To demonstrate this point,
the rest of this section analyzes a simple macroeconomic model
with sticky prices.  In this model, policy is neutral under
rational expectations, but non-neutral if agents underestimate
the effects of policy on aggregate demand.  With this deviation
from rationality, the model also fits our empirical results:
policy shifts predict errors in output expectations but not
inflation expectations.
B. Assumptions
     We consider an economy with an aggregate-demand curve--a
negative relation between the price level and aggregate spending:
   (1)     y  =  x - sp,     s > 0,11
where y is real output, p is the price level, and x is a term
capturing shifts in demand (all variables are in logs).  The
shift term x is determined by lagged monetary policy:
   (2)     x  =  q-1,
where q-1 measures the stance of monetary policy in the previous
period.  In comparing our empirical results to the model, we
interpret a rise in the real federal funds rate as a fall in  q. 
For simplicity, we ignore non-monetary shocks that shift
aggregate demand.
     The supply side of the economy is given by a simple sticky-
price model.  A firm’s desired nominal price, p*, is given by
   (3)     p*  =  p + vy,   v > 0,
which follows from the canonical macroeconomic model with
monopolistic competition.  Intuitively, an increase in aggregate
spending shifts out a firm’s demand curve, raising its desired
relative price.  (See Romer, 1996, Chapter 6.)  A firm must set
its price a period in advance.  It chooses a price equal to its
expected optimal price, p
e + vy
e, where a superscript e denotes
expectations in the previous period.  All firms are identical, so
this expression gives the aggregate price level as well as
individual prices:12
   (4)     p  =  p
e + vy
e.
     Most authors who study models such as ours assume rational
expectations (see Romer, for example).  We are interested,
however, in the idea that agents underestimate the effects of
policy shifts on aggregate demand.  A simple version of this
behavior is static expectations about the demand-shifter  x: x
e =
x-1.  Under this assumption, price setters believe that demand is
the same as in the previous period.  Since x = q-1, this is
equivalent to believing that q-1 equals q-2: price setters ignore
the most recent shift in policy.  Our assumption of static demand
expectations is, of course, extreme; future work could consider
cases in which expectations react partially to policy shifts.
     Aside from ignoring the most recent policy shift, firms
behave rationally.  In particular, they form rational
expectations of p and y conditional on their beliefs about x, and
the knowledge that other firms have the same beliefs.
C.  The Effects of Policy
     We now examine the effects of policy in our model.  We
assume that the policy stance q shifts over time and derive the
behavior of actual and expected inflation and output.  The nature
of the process driving q is not important for our purposes.
     As a benchmark, we first consider the case in which
expectations are fully rational.  In our model, current variables
are determined entirely by q-1, which is known when prices are
set.  Thus rational expectations is equivalent to perfect     8These derivations use our assumption that price setters
form rational expectations conditional on their beliefs about
demand.  After setting x
e = x-1, we derive the behavior of y and p
through standard rational-expectations arguments.
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foresight:  p
e = p and y
e = y.  Substituting these results into
(1) and (4) yields y = 0 and p = x/s = q-1/s.  Note that output
is not affected by the path of policy. 
     We now assume static expectations about x:  x
e = x-1.  Taking
expectations of equation (1) yields y
e =  x
e - sp
e, and hence y
e =
 x-1 - sp




e, and hence y
e = 0.  Combining these results and using (4)
again yields p = p
e = x-1/s.  Finally, substituting the solution
for p into (1) yields y = x - x-1 = q-1 - q-2. Combining these
results, we obtain
8
   (5)     y - y
e = x - x-1 = q-1 - q-2;
   (6)     p - p
e = 0.
     With static demand expectations, a shift in the policy
stance affects actual output: y depends on q-1 - q-2.  In
addition, equations (5) and (6) match our empirical findings
about expectations: a policy loosening leads to a positive output
surprise, but it does not cause an inflation surprise.  Thus our
model produces an explanation for monetary non-neutrality, and
the model’s empirical predictions are supported by the data.14
     Results (5) and (6) reflect the assumption that prices are
set before demand is determined.  A change in demand, which is a
surprise under static expectations, produces a contemporaneous
surprise in output.  In contrast, prices adjust to demand with a
lag.  Thus price changes are anticipated even if agents ignore
the current shift in demand.
V.  CONCLUSION
     This paper presents new evidence against the rational
expectations hypothesis: shifts in the real federal funds rate
predict errors in output expectations in the Survey of
Professional Forecasters.  We explain our results with a model in
which agents systematically underestimate the effects of policy
shifts on aggregate demand.  This deviation from rationality
helps explain the real effects of monetary policy.
     Why are expectations less than fully rational?  One
possibility is that agents form expectations using rules of thumb
to reduce the costs of gathering and processing information
(Ball, 1991; Roberts, 1997).  This may not, however, be a good
explanation for the professional forecasters in the SPF, who have
strong incentives to optimize fully.  Lamont (1995) suggests that
forecasters violate rationality because they have objectives
other than minimizing forecast errors, such as building their
reputations.  But similar violations of rationality occur in
surveys of consumers, who do not have such objectives (Ball and15
Croushore, 1995).  Explaining the behavior of expectations is a
crucial open area for research.  16
Table 1
Output Expectations
Survey of Professional Forecasters
1968Q4 to 1995Q2 (N = 107)
          y - y
f                       y
e - y
f                    y - y
e         
FF1 -0.878 -0.880 -0.413 -0.414 -0.464 -0.466
(0.208)      (0.223) (0.188)      (0.193) (0.143)      (0.155)
FF2    -         -0.243    -         -0.105    -         -0.138
(0.135) (0.157) (0.085)
P
2 sig. <.01 <.01     .03   .09  <.01 <.01
& R
2     .40    .42    -.02  -.05     .20    .21
Notes: This table reports results from regressing the column variable on the FF variable(s) listed in the
rows.  The regression coefficients are listed, with standard errors in parentheses.  P
2 SIG. is the
significance level for the test that the coefficients on all the FF variables are zero.17
Table 2
Inflation Expectations
Survey of Professional Forecasters
1968Q4 to 1995Q2 (N = 107)
            B - B
f                            B
e - B
f                          B - B
e             
FF1  0.272   0.278    0.155        -0.010   -0.005   -0.081  0.282   0.283   0.236
(0.215)   (0.222)   (0.211)       (0.108)   (0.110)  (0.102)      (0.184)     (0.189) (0.184)
FF2    - -0.340   -0.339    -   -0.305   -0.302     -      -0.035  -0.037
    (0.126)    (0.122)                        (0.114)   (0.117)     (0.078)  (0.070)
FF3    - -       -0.355    -  -  -0.105     -  -     -0.250
          (0.153)       (0.047)   (0.150)
P
2 sig.  .21      .03          .02              .93        .01         <.01     .13      .28     .13
&R
2    .07     .19           .31             -.05          .17       .21    .12     .12     .21
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